|
|
The AW rating was instituted in February 1968. It resulted from widespread fleet dissatisfaction with the results being achieved by air ASW forces. As the submarine threat was increasing in speed, depth, and attack capability, complex now equipments and procedures were appearing in the fleet to deal with the threat. However, our ASW data gathering system indicated we were simply not getting the performance from our sophisticated new systems that we should. To improve the situation it was concluded that we needed an Air ASW Sensor Operator on permanent flight orders, working full time at developing his operational skills, rather than trying to divided his time between operating ASW equipment in the air and maintaining them on the ground, to the detriment of both. Because most ASW aircrewmen had been drawn from the avionics community, the LDO/WO categories specified for the new rating were 761X/680X (Aviation Electronics Technician/Avionics) which also took inputs from the AT, AX, AQ, AE, and TD ratings. It was recognized at the time that eventually technical avionics would no longer provide an appropriate path of advancement from home grown AW's, who were to be totally operations-oriented and experienced without any residual avionics skills. That time was now rapidly approaching. More than two-thirds of the AW's in the fleet were now AW "A" School graduates, with little technical avionics training. An even more important consideration was the potential loss of the AW's unique antisubmarine expertise through the current path of advancement. ASW commanders in the fleet had noted with concern the incongruity of investing eight to ten years of operational experience developing the AW's skill as an airborne sensor operator, only to select out the very best AW's as Avionics Warrant Officers, to be grounded and assigned technical maintenance responsibilities outside the very skill area in which they were best qualified and most needed.
2. Cognizant commanders recognized this potential problem even before the AW rating was formally instituted some two years prior. CNO (OP-562D) noted that the Avionics LDO/WO path would not be appropriate for the AW, and recommended to BUPERS that a distinct new path be established. Similarly, COMHUKFORLANT and COMASWFORLANT both strongly endorsed this recommendation and noted the inappropriate progression and suggested that the AW advance to Naval Flight Officer (NFO) status as an ASW Tactical Coordinator (TACCO), to assure his high level of expertise developed over years of operational experience, not be lost to the critical needs of ASW. CNO then solicited other fleet opinions. CNATECHTRA, FAETULANT, VS-24, and COMCVSG-55 urged that a more appropriate path of advancement of the AW be investigated. Not everyone agreed, however, that he should advance to TACCO status, in view of the possible conflict with the unrestricted line NFO program.
3. CNO also requested that BUPERS initiate formal personnel research to determine a more practical path of advancement for the AW. The Naval Personnel and Training Research Laboratory, using the fleet responses to CNO, plus responses solicited from commands representing a significant sector of the air ASW community and the opinions of a number of AW's themselves, researched the problem in depth. This report was completed in February 1970.
My research is incomplete, but if you have any information on the history of our community, please email: The Flying Mustangs